When nation-building goes wrong

Middle East Eye

The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue by an American armoured vehicle in Baghdad’s Firdos Square in April 2003 became a telling reference point in Iraq’s recent history. The event marked the end of the battle for Baghdad, which shown live in many parts of the world had been hailed as proof that the US was still the world’s master, less than three years after the trauma of the 11 September, 2001 attacks.

Although the event was portrayed as one of great significance, important aspects were missed in the United States and the rest of the Western world. For instance, it was obvious that the crowds present there were small, and their enthusiasm not great.

Before the statue was toppled, US marine corporal Edward Chin covered the statue’s face with an American flag. The crowd became silent, and one woman shouted at the soldiers to remove the flag, which was replaced with an Iraqi one. Cynics later suggested that the whole event had been staged by the United States military.

Iraq descends

Post-Saddam triumphalism then so overwhelmed the American psyche that president George W Bush, just three weeks later on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, proclaimed this a “mission accomplished” moment. Within a month, Bush had appointed Paul Bremer as governor of Iraq, and dissolved the Ba’ath Party and armed forces — moves that in effect dismanted Iraq’s state structure. The logic was that only by destroying all the old regime could a Western-style democracy modelled on America’s vision be created.

Examples of post-conflict reconstruction in Japan and Germany after their defeat in World War II loomed large. However, both of these defeated powers were wealthy with advanced systems of their own before the war. The versions of democracy created as part of reconstruction had distinct Japanese and German cultural and national imprints.

It was assumed that a new Iraqi state after the 2003 invasion would equally have a strong imprint of Iraqi culture and historical experience. However, when after almost nine years of occupation the American military presence formally ended in December 2011, few could say this had been achieved.

Iraq’s chaotic emergence from eight years of occupation in 2011 was a reminder of what can go wrong in state- or nation-building, particularly when the victorious power’s cultural makeup is radically different from that of the defeated country. The cultural values on which a society is founded take long to evolve, and are so durable that any change involves risks and uncertainties.

However, Iraq is not a solitary example exposing the limits of American military power and its capacity for state-building in this century. As the world’s only remaining superpower, the US had visualised a world in its own image — a community of docile nations who would not challenge American power.

After experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recently Libya and Syria, Washington remains far from achieving this. Although America’s overwhelming power enables it to intervene and occupy foreign lands, the country’s ability to sustain war against resistors and undertake the task of state- or nation-building has been found wanting again and again.

Ruthless rulers emerge

Decisions taken immediately after Saddam Hussein’s overthrow were aimed at creating a new state structure to replace Iraq. Instead of a return to stability and rise to democracy, Iraq sank into a vicious multi-layered conflict after 2006, forcing the outgoing Bush administration to negotiate America’s exit — not the dawn of democracy Bush envisioned before leaving the White House. The downbeat exit in 2011 marked an embarrassing finale for the Bush presidency and a painful beginning for his successor, Barack Obama.

Democracy in Iraq is a forlorn hope. The continuing violence in which scores of people are killed and maimed every week is a largely forgotten story in the Western world. The Iraqi state, weakened by harsh American-led sanctions in the 1990s and dismantled in 2003, never regained the capacity to impose control over a fragmented nation, which was created under the 2005 constitution along with a new power elite.

The Shiite majority in the south and the Kurds in the north, long suppressed under Saddam’s rule, have become dominant. The minority Sunni elite that dominated the erstwhile power structure has been isolated, even demonised, in the absence of the effective checks and balances that a real democracy requires.

As sectarian violence prevails in today’s Iraq, ruthless and manipulative politicians like Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki have emerged. The country is neither a democracy nor a US ally.

A graveyard for nation-builders

Instead, Iran, once Iraq’s fiercest enemy, is now its closest ally. America’s neoconservative political establishment and its military-industrial complex may derive perverse satisfaction that Iraq is now unable to challenge the United States in the way that Saddam Hussein had attempted, but this seems cold comfort in the wider context.

Iraq has become the most serious failure in America’s democracy promotion enterprise thus far in the 21st century. But there are other examples, both in the immediate past and in the previous century.

The 11 September, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington prompted a US response in Afghanistan for the second time in two decades — the previous response being in the proxy war against the Soviet occupying forces in the 1980s. The enemy changed from communism to the Taliban militia; the motive was to shape events in West Asia in the West’s interests under the auspices of spreading freedom and democracy.

The US intervention in support of Afghanistan’s mujahideen against communist rule, in particular after the Soviets invaded the country in December 1979, revealed contradictions often seen in other places. An external power’s backing for radical groups in an internal conflict changes the balance in ways that have long- and short-term. In conflicts like Afghanistan, when the intervening power supports a weak non-state or state player, the motive is to gain a foothold and then permanent influence. However, the power thereby contributes to a culture in which violence becomes the primary means of settling disputes and keeping order.

Fragmented societies

Armed groups may not enjoy support in the wider population, but they gain ascendancy. Constitutional arrangements are under sustained pressure until they lose legitimacy. The result is a new fragmented society in which different militant groups occupy their own domains. This is the very opposite of democracy, which takes a long time to evolve.

The failure of nation-building in Afghanistan since the mid-20th century has been due to a combination of factors: conflicting ideological visions of the Soviet Union and the United States as they fought for influence in West Asia during the Cold War, and interests and motives of regional players, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India.

America’s stated aim was to build state institutions, but the war undermined all such efforts. Since the decade of democracy in the 1960s, the legislative, executive and judicial branches of state were supposed to bring various interest groups together at the centre in Kabul and build a system of checks and balances based on the Western democratic model. Persistent foreign involvement made certain that the reverse happened.

The destruction of the Afghan state from the 1978 communist coup to America’s overthrow of the Taliban regime in December 2001, weeks after the 11 September attacks, was complete.

America’s return after years of neglect raised new hopes for Afghanistan. Those hopes, however, began to fade with the Taliban’s revival barely three years later. Since then, a combination of violence, societal resistance and corruption has created obstacles which have proved insurmountable, steadily draining America’s will to sustain its nation-building mission.

The Afghan experience

Amid a serious crisis of confidence between the Obama administration and President Hamid Karzai in his final months as president, the December 2014 deadline for US military withdrawal is rapidly approaching. A proposed military agreement to keep a limited number of troops in Afghanistan has not been signed, but left to President Karzai’s successor. Like Iraq, the United States is about to leave Afghanistan with its mission of nation-building far from successful.

After 13 years of US-led occupation, the Afghan state remains fragile. It is dependent on massive foreign aid, and its fragmented society is a threat to itself and others. The United States’ presence over these years has halted Afghanistan’s slide into disorder. But the US military’s heavy-handed tactics, such as drone attacks and night raids on the homes of Afghans have also fuelled resentment against the US.

The Taliban’s campaign of violence against the 2014 presidential elections in March failed to frighten away voters, who defied threats to turn out in large numbers. However, tribal societies are built in ways that give certain individuals and groups power beyond their size – a danger that still exists.

Afghanistan, Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries have their own particularities, and not to fully comprehend them is central to America’s difficulties in the region. Power in these societies flows from tribal sheikhs who disburse the means of livelihood in rural communities; village imams who interpret customary law, act as judges to settle disputes and issue edicts; and traders who control the bazaar. The king has needed all three to stay on the throne. When the ruler has lost support of one or more sources of real power, he is in trouble.

Great powers who have attempted to impose a new model on these countries have encountered great difficulties. When a king is bought, or a weak individual is installed by an outside power, there often is a rebellion from below involving local elites. When a people feel manipulated by an external power, there is often a sense of resentment and victimhood in that society against the outsider.

In countries such as Egypt and Pakistan, the United States has supported dictatorships to win advantage in the race for influence. The result is deterioration of legislative bodies which are supposed to represent citizens, and judiciary that delivers justice in which people must have confidence. Hence, the nation’s political system becomes hostage to great power ambitions. It has happened not only in the Middle East and South Asia, but elsewhere during the Cold War and after – for instance, in the Philippines, South Korea and South Vietnam; Somalia and what was Zaire; and Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Geopolitical interests

These and other countries have seen some of the most brutal right-wing dictatorships and human rights violations, supported covertly or overtly by Washington, because they served US interests. Twenty-five years after the Cold War ended, the trend continues, and the cause of democracy and nation-building suffers as it runs counter to American geopolitical interests.

Washington’s policy towards popular uprisings across the Arab world has illustrated its contradictions in recent years. When massive protests broke out against authoritarian rule in Tunisia and spread towards the Persian Gulf, including Egypt, Libya, Syria and Bahrain, the Obama administration was caught by surprise, and appeared unsure about what to do. Libyan and Syrian rulers had challenged United States policy in the Cold War, aligning themselves with Moscow; Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain were close military allies of Washington, serving America’s interests in the region.

Freedom, democracy, human rights and state-building were therefore all important in Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown and killed by anti-Gaddafi militias backed by the United States and allies. In Syria, Washington first backed anti-Assad groups, then got cold feet. Assad survives for now, but the conflict has left Syria in ruins, and atrocities by both sides have caused great misery for millions of civilians. Syria’s refugee crisis is among the worst today.

Libya under Gaddafi was a failing state ruled by a maverick dictator through strictly controlled people’s committees. Now, it is a failed and fragmented state. Rival militias fight between themselves. Much of the infrastructure has been destroyed. People live in fear, and the country has become a leading source of weapons to militants who fight in conflicts across the Arab world. Even the prime minister of Libya cannot feel safe.

A history of failures

United States policy towards Saudi Arabia’s theocracy is mostly one of respectful silence. The Saud family exercises absolute power, state institutions are few and governance is according to the ruling family’s own strict interpretation of Islamic law. When relations between Washington and Riyadh are strained, such as over the Obama administration’s attempts to improve ties with Iran and his decision not to launch air attacks against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, it is the United States that makes overt attempts to repair those relations.

Saudi Arabia is too important as an oil supplier to the industrialised world, buyer of sophisticated weaponry and as the leader of Sunni Islam to alienate. Amid all the push for state-building, democracy and free institutions elsewhere, change in Saudi Arabia takes a back seat. Since Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s decision to break from the Soviet Union and join the United States in the 1970s, and his signing of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the US alliance with Egypt has been too important to jeopardise American interests in the Middle East.

America’s unease over Egypt’s popular uprising against President Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power and the Obama administration’s soft reaction following President Mohammed Morsi’s removal by the military illustrate the difference between the reality of American actions and the rhetoric about the freedom agenda and nation-building in Washington.

The question remains whether the real motive of the United States is to build free, democratic and sustainable nations. Or it is to eliminate perceived threats to American interests, and if state-building proves too arduous, to leave such countries weak and vulnerable.

[END]

The Perils of Dead Certainty

CounterPunch

The spectacular rise of the Aam Aadmi (Common Man) Party to power after last December’s assembly elections in the Indian capital Delhi, and its fall after just 49 days in office, inform us about India’s turbulent politics. These events are consequences of the Indian electorate’s anger and frustration at the established parties, and a strong desire to break away from the past. They have also created a good deal of confusion and polarization among the people as the country heads for general elections in April and May 2014.

The AAP’s appeal as an anti-corruption phenomenon was responsible for the largest number of seats it won in the capital’s assembly, though still well short of a majority. To form a minority government, the AAP chose to accept outside support from the Congress Party which it had defeated, yet continued its crusade against Congress. For the AAP’s leadership, all other parties were legitimate targets, to be attacked in the most strident terms. Political leaders, businessmen, even fellow party members who disagreed were routinely accused of corruption or insubordination.

Now that the short-lived administration of Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal is no longer in power, central rule has been imposed in Delhi, and battles are being fought in courts. Kejriwal’s party has mounted a challenge in the Indian Supreme Court against the imposition of central rule in the capital after its defeat in a crucial vote. The former chief minister and his colleagues are themselves threatened with law suits – so unsubstantiated were their allegations against specific individuals.

The AAP has attracted some support from sections of the population eager to punish the Congress-led coalition for corruption, mismanagement or failure to maintain law and order. However, the Kejriwal band remains a one-issue party, and its suitability as a serious force in advance of the next general elections must be in question. The AAP’s popular support nationwide is yet to be tested.

Nevertheless, the AAP has been quick to move from governing Delhi to launching a national campaign for the next parliamentary elections. It claims to have prepared a list of the “most corrupt people” and has begun to announce its candidates against them. In the process, the party seems to have bid farewell to its earlier promise to hold American-style primaries for selection of candidates. The odd mix of populism and authoritarianism has added to the confusion about what the “ordinary man’s party” is really up to.

After a brief period in power in a mini-state, the AAP faces a critical reassessment by its supporters, and the wider electorate. Its image as a party of lawful and clean governance has taken a battering as a result of vigilante tactics of its members. The AAP’s rise was mainly due to the loss of public confidence in India’s established parties, but its subsequent conduct has raised questions about the alternative it offers, and what it means for the Indian democracy.

Unusual tactics

Leading jurists and civil society activists had been expressing disapproval of the AAP’s polarising tactics from the outset. In one astonishing act, Chief Minister Kejriwal, his cabinet colleagues and leading supporters broke through police barricades and violated a prohibition order against political gatherings near the Indian Parliament and administrative district. Another polarising action was to cut by half the electricity bills of Delhi residents who had refused to pay their bills for several months in protest against increased charges, but not of residents who had paid despite financial difficulties.

The Supreme Court of India issued notices to the Kejriwal administration and the central government, asking them to explain how the extraordinary protest took place in the capital. The issue, according to the court, was of constitutional importance, raising questions about whether a chief minister could resort to agitation in violation of the law in his own state. As well as the decision to charge his predecessor Sheila Dikshit with corruption, the Kejriwal administration had plans to strip magistrates in Delhi of their responsibility to issue marriage certificates, and to give the authority to issue licenses for building projects and local services to “people’s gatherings” to be held from time to time.

A meandering journey

An offspring of Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption reformist movement, a group led by 45-year-old Kejriwal, a former Income Tax official, broke away to become the Aam Aadmi Party in 2012. The party won the largest number of seats, though not a majority, in the Delhi assembly elections, and formed a minority government when the defeated Congress Party offered its external support in December 2013.

The AAP’s ambition for power was undisguised, but the scope of its political appetite and future tactics were far from clear. Hazare would have nothing to do with Kejriwal and his associates. While Hazare’s initiative remained a loose social movement, Kejriwal’s newly founded party began to attract attention of people hungry for action against corruption and government inertia. A number of highly publicised attacks on women and young people fuelled the discontent already there.

Systemic failures of this kind can make a situation explosive, offering fertile ground for populist groups with good intentions, as well as opportunists. It is sometimes not easy to distinguish between the two. Weak or inept government risks anarchy, and vigilantes determined to enforce laws of their own take over.

Vigilante groups may lack unity, so they seek an external target to maintain a semblance of unity. The spectacle witnessed following the governing Congress Party’s heavy defeat in the Delhi assembly elections was extraordinary. Lack of certainty was replaced by politics of dead certainty.

Self-righteous behaviour and delivery of direct justice by Chief Minister Kejriwal, his ministers and party members were on display from day one. When Law Minister Somnath Bharati led a midnight raid with his supporters on a house of African women in South Delhi, there was a crisis. The minister summoned local police, and proceeded to order the officers who had come to the scene to arrest the women, accusing them of prostitution and drug offenses.

Confrontation with police

The police officers refused to obey the minister, because they said they did not have a magistrate’s warrant for arrest. The women, said to be from Uganda, were then taken to the All India Medical Institute, where the law minister also turned up, and the women were forced to give urine samples. No traces of drugs were found. The women have since accused the AAP supporters of harassing, beating and threatening them.

In an era of globalised 24-hour news, it was an instant national and international story, generating alarm and negative reaction. India’s ministry of external affairs intervened to assure foreigners that they were safe and welcome in the country, and that relations with Africa were important and unaffected.

Criticisms of the treatment of foreign women in their own home in Delhi grew, and the confrontation took a more ugly turn. Kejriwal’s battle became one of capturing control of the Delhi Police force from the central government. As the chief minister, with his supporters, marched towards the Indian Parliament, they were prevented, because there was a ban on public gatherings. So they began an “indefinite” sit-in, demanding that five police officers be suspended, and India’s home ministry hand over control of the police to the Delhi state government.  

Kejriwal and his followers overran the police barricades. Clashes broke out in which dozens of people were injured on both sides. The chief minister held meetings of his cabinet in his vehicle at the protest venue. Official files were doing rounds of the streets of Delhi. Metro stations serving the capital’s administrative district were closed, and the chief minister threatened to disrupt India’s Republic Day celebrations which foreign guests were to attend.

Exactly what long-term impact this style of politics will have across the country is not certain. However, judging from reactions of India’s middle classes and the media, the APP’s image has suffered.

The AAP represents a phenomenon whose causes can be explained, but its effects are disturbing. The phenomenon is not unprecedented. In other places across the world, we have seen anger and discontent, and the emergence of populist forces challenging the established authority that is corrupt and inept. However, alternatives offered by populist politics are hardly the answer, because they can lead to unpredictable consequences, the worst of which were seen before and during World War II in Europe. The events in Europe during the turmoil between the two wars should serve as a warning to India’s electorate against going down that path.

The Congress Party-led coalition which has governed India in recent years faces a tough challenge in the coming general elections, at a time when the leadership of Congress and some of the other parties is in transition. India’s democracy finds itself at a crossroads, and the choice is going to be either constitutional politics and rule of law, or rule by populist impulses.

[END]

No end to the revolution?

AL JAZEERA

History has the answer to the turbulent Middle East today. 

The approaching centenary of the outbreak of World War I is a suitable time to consider violent conflicts between nations and ideologies, and their consequences, which have transformed the international system, particularly in the Middle East.

The most decisive of these conflicts were part of three critical periods of the 20th century: World War I, 1914-1918, and the 1917 communist revolution in Russia; World War II ending in 1945 with the division of Europe and the Cold War thereafter; and the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. These fateful chapters of history left a lasting impact on the global map, and transformed the Middle East into the turbulent region which it is today.

Despite the central powers’ defeat in World War I, Germany and Austria-Hungary lived to fight another war two decades later. But the most consequential events of the World War I period were the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the rise of communists to power in Russia.

Creation of mandates 

The demise of the Ottoman Empire meant the release of its provinces in the Middle East. The region was divided into British and French spheres of influence, using the instrument of “mandate” and readily approved by the League of Nations. The Russian Revolution of 1917 led to the birth of the Soviet Union five years after. Communism became an ideological reality that promised liberation forces in colonies as an alternative to imperial subjugation.

The age of empires was not over, but there was a new worldview in action, embracing the idea of class struggle and becoming a serious rival of Western imperialism. The events in Russia in 1917, emboldened revolutionary forces across Asia, Africa and South America. Communists seized power after long, savage wars in China in 1949, and Cuba in 1959. Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara became heroes for left-wing armed revolutionaries in their own countries and elsewhere.

The Soviet Union’s emergence as a superpower rival of the United States in the wake of World War II, gave it a formidable status, and the means to support revolutionary movements across the world. However, there was an obvious paradox in the manner of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, and how the Kremlin controlled its satellite-states with an iron fist for more than four decades.

The Soviet Union had enlarged its empire from Central Asia to Eastern Europe while proclaiming to be the liberator of oppressed peoples from Western imperialism. The Soviets were also involved with the US in a global race for influence called the Cold War, in which the energy-rich Middle East was the main battleground. Even as the colonial system collapsed, the Cold War intensified. It was a race between two empires in all but name.

The Dictionary of Human Geography defines imperialism as “an unequal human and territorial relationship”. The association takes the form of an empire, based on “ideas of superiority and practices of dominance”. Imperialism involves the extension of authority and control of one state or people over another. While capitalism has solely commercial motives, an imperial relationship also requires a political centre and ideological allegiance which ties the periphery to the centre.

Legacy of Cold War 

Rival ideologies pulled Middle Eastern countries towards Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, and fuelled conflicts that had remained unsettled. The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 was to have been the end of history, with the US the final victor standing, to dominate the vast energy resources, and much more. However, that triumphant vision failed to realise that Islam, together with nationalism, was going to be the next formidable opposition, replacing Soviet communism. A lot of blood has been spilled at the extremes of that conflict, while even moderates are critical or ambivalent about Western policy.

Much of the Middle East is in a state of agitation and turmoil. The legacy of old unresolved feuds has been revived. Two of the main causes are the imperial powers’ arbitrary partition of the region into smaller, vulnerable entities, thereby dividing their peoples; and the Palestinians’ loss of land and livelihood under Israeli occupation. The people’s desire to liberate themselves from dictatorship has been rekindled, but the scope for opportunistic machinations from outside remains.

Islamic, secular and democratic, all forces fight, sometimes together, at other times separately, in this chaotic struggle. Their vision of the future may differ, but their spirit is revolutionary in that they seek radical change. Still, fundamental questions about what type of change, and the way to bring it, remain. Hope, fear, and uncertainty, coalesce together.

The risk of tyranny of some over many is always great in a region of diverse religious and ethnic groups, with a history of conflict. From Afghanistan and Iraq to Syria, Egypt and Libya, violence against vulnerable citizens, minorities in particular, heightens fears in those countries and outside.

The peoples of the Middle East have lived through autocratic nationalist rule, and dictatorship acting as proxy of one external power or another. Their painful experiences have made the Middle East of today. Where are events heading? Well, as French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville said, “In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end.”

[END]

Mandela, Manning and Snowden – rebels who answered the call of higher duty

CounterPunch 

Two individuals who have unquestionably dominated the 2013 agenda are Nelson Mandela and Edward Snowden. Their treatment in the media could hardly be more different. Yet in many respects what they share is remarkable, and that they brought out the best and the worst in humanity is no less so.

Mandela’s struggle against apartheid, remembered again after his death, and Snowden’s baring of the worldwide intelligence colossus built by the United States, have stirred a much-needed debate on morality and manipulation of law in conducting mass surveillance, and then justifying the practice by shifty arguments. Bradley Manning’s disclosures of the US military’s shocking conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, his trial and sentencing are also of great importance. However, the spread of Snowden’s revelations is global, and their ramifications are going to be more profound and lasting.

Mandela and Snowden are rebels from different generations – both classed as criminals as they took on the system. While going against the existing regime designed to serve the interests of a few at the cost of the vast majority, Mandela and Snowden answered the call of higher duty, beyond man-made legal measures which are unjust and unacceptable. To Mandela, South Africa’s apartheid system, with all its consequences, was so repugnant. To Snowden, the abuse of power involving the wholesale surveillance of citizens and world leaders was so wrong that it changed the game.

The association of Mandela and Snowden with Moscow also bears a remarkable similarity between the two men. Mandela’s African National Congress was supported by the Soviet Union in the era of Communism, and members of the South African Communist Party were in the ANC. In the post-Soviet era, it was Moscow where Snowden found refuge, as the Obama administration used all its power to have him captured and brought back to the United States.

Mandela was lucky to escape the death penalty, received a life sentence in 1964, and spent more than a quarter century in harsh prison conditions. If Snowden had been returned to America, almost certainly he would have spent the rest of his life in jail – and it could have been worse.

Radical and determined, their activities have been polarising at home and abroad. Feted by their admirers and reviled by defamers, their actions raise very difficult questions, only to receive glib responses. In confronting South Africa’s stubborn racist regime after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the subsequent banning of the ANC, Mandela concluded that they had to abandon nonviolence. He explained later that “when the oppressor – in addition to his repressive policies – uses violence against the oppressed, the oppressed have no alternative but to retaliate by similar forms of action.” Mandela had to go underground before he and other senior ANC leaders were captured, tried and sentenced.

To escape a similar fate, especially after Bradley Manning’s 35-year sentence, Edward Snowden decided to leave the United States, ending up in Russia. To suggest that Snowden should have stayed in his country and justified his actions in US courts is either naïve or disingenuous. For the personal cost of such actions is very high, as Mandela, Manning and Snowden have all found.

There are people who will disagree with the very idea of finding a connection between the three despite compelling similarities. It is always easy to admire someone who was once a rebel, highlighted what was reprobate in society and furthered the cause of human consciousness – all a long time ago. The making of Mandela’s image took decades. The sustained official vilification of Manning and Snowden now reminds us of the manner in which Mandela was treated by the South African authorities and Western governments, indeed by the media, at the time of his rebellion fifty years ago.

All of which draws attention to the scramble among the world’s most powerful leaders to be seen at Mandela’s memorial and funeral, and to join in the adulation of his people, while the same leaders have been busy in the vilification of those many regard as young heroes of today. The oddity, in part, is due to the addiction to television cameras that has become an essential part of showbiz politics. There also exists a craving in political leaders to preach the world what they fail to practice themselves. Their desire to look good is irresistible. The general loss of trust in public figures and institutions is a consequence of their instinct for expediency. The potency of their message of toleration and reconciliation to Africa would be more convincing if liberal and moral values were not so much under pressure as they are in the West itself.

The long and arduous struggle of Mandela reflected the revolutionary spirit of his predecessors, one of whom was German revolutionary and American statesman Carl Schurz, whose words are appropriate here: “My country right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when wrong to be put right.” Not missing the opportunity of reconciliation when it finally came was something that made Mandela great.

It would be premature to compare Manning and Snowden with Mandela, for their struggles are current, and not time tested. Where they can be contrasted, favourably, with Nelson Mandela is in their struggles for higher moral values which go beyond the narrow boundaries of nationalism and patriotism. 

[END] 

Obama’s Middle East Gamble

Al-Ahram Weekly 

imagesUS President Barack Obama is on a diplomatic offensive on several fronts in the Middle East. The six-month interim agreement between the major world powers, five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the European Union, and Iran to restrain its nuclear program is being described as the most important development in their relations since the Iranian Revolution. The agreement has set off a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington, raising hopes that much more is to follow.

The French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has suggested that the European Union may lift some sanctions on Iran as early as December. A new round of peace talks on Syria has been announced for next January. President Bashar al-Assad says his government will attend, but the participation of several opposition groups is in doubt.

In Afghanistan, a tribal grand assembly has recommended that President Karzai sign a security pact with the United States, before the end of the year, as the Obama administration wants. However, Karzai insists on a firm American commitment to stop night raids on Afghan homes, a “correct and dignified” presidential election and stability, without which he will not sign the security pact. He says that he wants to leave the signing to his successor after the April 2014 election. Then there are the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, slow and protracted as they have been for decades. Obama’s diplomacy on so many fronts is a sign of incredible ambition, and requires great energy and deftness.

These matters, with their ramifications for the region, deserve careful assessment. President Obama has embarked on a far-reaching enterprise hoping for great rewards, but there are high risks, too. Why should he want such a radical change of course? His game plan is worth examining.

Years of cold war and economic sanctions have had dire consequences for the Iranian economy, but it would be wrong to claim that Washington has emerged unhurt. The United States lost access to Iran, a major energy source and a large market for American corporations. Anarchy rules Libya, and terror overflows to other countries of the region, after the West’s miscalculation in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime. Libya’s oil production has been disrupted. Iran has become more important as a source of energy.

The loss of influence in Tehran had made the United States overly dependent on Saudi Arabia and Israel. Both benefited greatly by consistently playing the Iran card in their dealings with successive US administrations since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. America’s capacity to shape events diminished in Syria and Lebanon, where Iran’s influence is considerable. Following the 2003 US invasion and Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, Iraq moved close to Iran, and there is a pro-Tehran government in Baghdad. The Shia uprising in Bahrain, where the US Fifth Fleet is based, has to be controlled by the emirate’s rulers from the Sunni minority with an iron fist.

Iran’s help to the Americans in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban regime’s removal, and Hamid Karzai’s installation in power, had promised an era of hope for relations between Washington and Tehran. That hopeful era proved short-lived when President George W. Bush’s administration changed its tune. In particular, the Iranians felt betrayed by Bush’s description in January 2002 of their country being one of the “axis of evil” along with Iraq and North Korea. Despite Iran paying a very high price since the 1979 revolution, there has been a price paid by successive American administrations, too, including in terms of credibility lost. When the political environment is polarized sharply, the room for maneuver is limited severely.

Is President Obama out to craft a new US grand design in the Middle East in the remainder of his second term? It requires a radical realignment of American policy. Washington would have to build a new road to Tehran, linking Iran to Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan. The road to Israel and Saudi Arabia would take second place. It is this prospect which makes both Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the Israeli government’s supporters in the US Congress, nervous.

Has Obama got what it takes to overcome the hurdles? Obama’s opponents can thwart his Middle East plan, individually or collectively. Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the biggest obstacle. While all eyes were focused on Syria, and on talks in Geneva with Iran, the Americans and the Iranians were holding secret negotiations without Netanyahu knowing about the clandestine US-Iranian dealings. This is a remarkable happening, which has infuriated Netanyahu.

The Israeli prime minister looks isolated on the international stage, but his support in the American Congress could still wreck the deal with Iran, whose cooperation is going to be vital for stability in Afghanistan during and after most NATO troops are withdrawn by the end of 2014. There are two main reasons why Tehran’s cooperation is necessary. First of all, it is going to fall upon Afghan government forces to deal with the Pashtun Taliban’s resurgent activity in the south and east; so the north and west close to the border with Iran must be kept at peace. Furthermore, non-Pashtun minorities with close links with Iran are overrepresented in the Afghan armed forces. With only a few thousand American troops left in the country, it will be essential that the Afghan military remains together.

The next six months are going to be most decisive. At the end, we will know whether Iran’s agreement with the major world powers has a long-term future. We will also find out how far pro-Israel jingoists and war hawks such as New York Senator Chuck Schumer succeed in turning their threat of sabotaging Obama’s Middle East plan into reality. Speaking at a children’s charity fundraiser, Schumer spoke of working in Congress to impose more crippling sanctions against Iran and ‘defeat’ the Arab world and Palestinians.

The next few months will also tell whether President Rouhani of Iran, backed by the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, can prevail over conservative opponents in his own country. And how events unfold in Afghanistan affecting Obama’s dispute with President Karzai over the US-Afghan security pact. Above everything else, the most important question is whether Obama will drive his project hard enough for it to have a long life. Or it is destined to be another ‘big idea’ which gets buried in the sands of the Middle East.

[END]

Obama, Karzai and the Afghan labyrinth

AL JAZEERA

With deep mutual distrust, Obama and Karzai consider their legacies.

The Afghan Loya Jirga’s endorsement of a security pact with the United States, to be signed by December 31, has brought to an end the uncertainty over the status of foreign troops, and Afghanistan’s relations with its donors, after most NATO forces are withdrawn from the country next year. However, it happened not before the whole labyrinth of Afghanistan was under the spotlight, and some lively exchanges were made between all sides.

First, the New York Times reported that President Hamid Karzai had given up his opposition to Washington’s demands that US soldiers be immune from Afghan prosecution, and US special forces continue to have freedom to conduct “antiterrorism raids on private Afghan homes”. But soon after, the proceedings at the Loya Jirga had a moderating effect on that optimism.

Distrustful relationship

President Karzai’s remarks about there being no trust between him and the US, and yet his call on the assembly to support the security pact, spoke volumes about Afghanistan’s need for economic assistance and stability on one hand, and the war and deep divisions which continue to traumatise the country on the other. Several members of parliament and the entire opposition had announced a boycott in advance.

A female delegate at the Loya Jirga shouted from the floor: “US troops had spilt too much Afghan blood, and should be stopped.” And Shia religious leader Ayatollah Salehi said: “Judicial immunity is against our independence, national sovereignty, against the will of the Afghan people and explicitly in contravention of Islam.” In a society with deeply embedded religious and tribal customs, many people are enraged by US troops’ night raids on their homes, and their acts of violence against Afghan civilians.

Divided society

The Taliban, still fighting after they were removed from power following the  US invasion in 2001, described the Loya Jirga as a “council of traitors“, saying that “internal mercenaries” wanted to ensure the foreign forces’ prolonged stay in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s uncompromising attitude, and the thousands of US troops staying under the security pact once it is signed, suggest that Afghanistan will remain a country in conflict.

The scenario helps explain Karzai’s announcement at the opening ceremony that any agreement on the status of US forces should wait until after the presidential election in April 2014, and should be signed by his successor. The Obama administration, caught by surprise and showing urgency, insisted that the Afghans needed to approve and sign the agreement by the end of 2013. It would give Kabul little more than a month.

For the US, it was neither “practical nor possible” to delay the signing. There was an implied threat that a failure would lead to the withdrawal of all troops, and no US aid to Afghanistan.

Roots of discord

The truth is that the US did not want a total withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the brinkmanship between Kabul and Washington raised intriguing questions. Why did President Karzai want to delay the signing until his successor had assumed office after the April 2014 election? And why should the US have viewed a four-month delay so calamitous for the agreement? After all, the US is a country known for drawn-out legislative processes.

Karzai was the US’ preferred choice to lead Afghanistan after the Taliban regime’s overthrow in 2001, but their relations have deteriorated steadily, especially under the Obama presidency. Accusations of corruption, incompetence and nepotism against the Karzai administration abound, though these ills afflict all sides in a clearly troubled partnership.

Alongside the US narrative of problems with the Afghan president and his close circle, there is an important narrative about President Obama and his administration’s conduct that has been perceived in Kabul as having caused deliberate and repeated humiliations of Afghanistan and President Karzai. The Afghan narrative should not be ignored in any serious attempt to understand the problems.

A great power demands compliance from minor entities. Karzai has often been defiant, and critical of US-led military operations resulting in civilian casualties and disrupted life for the Afghans. In this respect, Karzai is not like the other US dictator allies: A few names that come to mind are Marcos of the Philippines, Thieu of South Vietnam, Somoza of Nicaragua many a year ago, and Pervez Musharraf and Hosni Mubarak more recently.

Karzai was part of the anti-Communist Afghan opposition in the 1980s. He is well aware of the failed Soviet attempts to use loyal rulers to lead Communist regimes in Kabul. It was a somewhat risky move for the White House to publicly set a deadline barely a month away, at a time when the Loya Jirga was meeting. A swift response was issued from Kabul, that it “will not be rushed”, and that “President Karzai’s desire to sign the agreement after next year’s presidential election was the only deadline recognised by Afghanistan”.

The Afghanistan Times had earlier quoted Karzai as saying that the security pact could only be signed “when our elections are conducted, correctly and with dignity”. His spokesman underlined the need to secure the Loya Jirga’s approval. Afghan constitutions have come and gone with the country’s upheavals. The customary role of tribal assemblies in approving a constitution, resolving disputes and considering issues of national importance has remained constant. The process may not be perfect, but in the absence of the tribal jirga, legitimacy, in the eyes of many Afghans, is difficult to achieve.

Divergent imperatives

As Obama and Karzai both approach the end of their final term as president, they are under competing political pressures. Obama, who is due to leave the White House in January 2017, is a man in a hurry, at a time when success is by no means certain in the latest Israeli-Palestinian talks, and rapprochement with Iran has just started after more than three decades of cold war, and tedious negotiations in recent months finally resulting in a historic, but fragile, agreement on Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Karzai, whose presidential term will end after the April 2014 election, has personal as well as long-term considerations. In a distrustful relationship, Karzai’s interest is in securing maximum cover for himself in the eyes of his people; true national sovereignty; and freedom for the next Afghan president to act. In essence, a legacy which, Karzai can argue, was delivered at a time of extreme national emergency.

[END]

Afghanistan: Countdown to US withdrawal

AL JAZEERA

Attention may now turn from the Arab uprisings to Afghanistan as the US and NATO forces prepare to leave in 2014. 

For three years, the world’s eyes have been focused on the Arab uprisings and subsequent events, but now the attention is going to turn to Afghanistan as US-led foreign troops prepare to leave the country next year. Even though some foreign advisers will remain, the NATO withdrawal will bring an end to the military response of President George W Bush against Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers, which was launched with lofty promises after the September 11 attacks on the US.

It is undeniable that the war has been very costly. Today, the Taliban are stronger than they were immediately after their eviction from Kabul. The militancy has spread far beyond the country’s borders, and the mission that President Barack Obama called a “just war” is reaching its finale without its most important aims fulfilled.

It is difficult to think of an Afghan more congenial than Hamid Karzai that Washington could have found to install in power following the removal of the Taliban in 2001. As he prepares to leave office after the April 2014 election, President Karzai is sharply critical of NATO, remonstrating that “on the security front, the entire NATO exercise caused Afghanistan a lot of suffering, a lot of loss of life and no gains, because the country is not secure”.

Afghan reality

NATO and the US have accused Karzai of unreliability and corruption, but they ignore the Afghan reality. President Karzai has to voice the deep antagonism felt against foreign troops in the country and cannot remain silent about civilian casualties. He is mindful of the fragile nature of Afghanistan’s military and police forces, which NATO undertook to train and equip.

As many as 50,000 desertions are haemorrhaging Afghanistan’s security forces every year. The latest high-profile defector was a special forces commander who joined the Hizb-e-Islami organisation, a Taliban-affiliated group, taking with him guns and high-tech military equipment.

Corruption has been a sad historical fact in a country that is among the most impoverished in the world. Ceaseless wars since the 1970s – wars in which external powers, the US, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan’s neighbours have been active participants – have made Afghanistan’s destitution all the greater. Western accusations of corruption against the Karzai administration are self-serving at times, and ignore the West’s own corrupt practices in the course of the Afghan war.

Military occupation and offence to the occupied go together. Afghans have suffered cruel losses and humiliation again and again during the past twelve years, under Soviet occupation in the 1980s and before. Afghanistan’s ethno-tribal society requires its rulers to be close to their subjects in ways that Western governments have not fully understood.

The legacy of US war in Afghanistan

The departure of US and NATO troops in 2014 will be another landmark in the 35-year history of Afghan wars. The symbolism of the Soviet retreat in 1989 was greater because it happened as the Soviet empire was collapsing. The circumstances for the US empire are not so precarious, and NATO’s immediate future is not in doubt.

However, in Afghanistan and outside, there are going to be those who will see this withdrawal as another defeat of a great power. The US will continue to struggle to justify its claim that the Afghan mission has been a success. Once fervent supporters of the mission to eliminate terrorism and redesign society now realise the Afghan project’s grim realities. Even those less partisan may conclude that it has been a missed opportunity in several respects.

The legality and morality of US drone attacks across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and increasingly in other countries, is a subject of open debate, raising questions about laws of war, human rights and national sovereignty. The impact of this debate on international relations is going to be an enduring legacy of the Bush and Obama administrations.

That legacy will continue to evoke memories of the tense relationship between Obama and Karzai – who was the US choice to be the leader of Afghanistan but who could not entirely support Washington’s agenda. For all his charm, elegance and urbane manners, Karzai is still an Afghan who cannot remove himself enough from his fellow countrymen to please the US. He will be remembered as a president whose true authority was always limited, but was held responsible for many of the failures of others.

End of foreign involvement?

More than a decade after the US went to Afghanistan to eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the curtain is about to close on one more episode in the country’s endless wars. In 1989, the Americans were euphoric about defeating the Soviet occupiers with the Mujahideen’s help in a proxy war. As the Americans prepare to bail out in 2014, the old fog of euphoria has lifted, and it is possible to argue with greater certainty that, ultimately, Afghans do not need a major external power to fight the enemy.

Words attributed to two of the best known Afghan warlords of modern times are informative. In the 1980s, when Washington was the Mujahideen’s main backer against the Soviet Union, Ismael Khan said: “The Americans want us to continue fighting but not to win, just to bleed the Russians.” Another anti-Soviet commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, remarked: “We will not be a pawn in someone else’s game; we will always be Afghanistan.”

The Obama administration’s attempts to launch negotiations with the Taliban on concrete matters have not brought success. At times, President Karzai has felt left out, and has reacted with his own overtures to the Taliban. Such overtures have not pleased the US, which has appeared to undermine Karzai’s independent initiatives. The recent arrest of senior Taliban commander Latif Mehsud by the US angered the Afghan president, because it was reported that his government was trying to recruit Mehsud as a go-between for peace talks.

Haunting possibilities

As the departure of foreign troops draws closer, many in Afghanistan and its regional neighbourhood are concerned about the future. There are questions about next year’s presidential election taking place in a peaceful and orderly manner, and whether the new government will be stable.

What will the Taliban and members of Pakistan’s political and military establishments with links to the armed group do? How will Saudi Arabia and Iran, representing the Sunni-Shia struggle for influence in the Muslim world, affect Afghanistan as the country tries to stand on its own two feet? Will influential players of the international community help Afghanistan? Or will they walk away like they did following the 1989 Soviet retreat, leaving regional powers and Afghan factions to fight it out?

Such haunting possibilities are going to occupy minds more and more as US and NATO troops prepare to leave Afghanistan.

[END]